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REPORT ON THE CHILDREN'S COURT OF CONCILIATION, A DEPARTMENT OF THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IN
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES*
By HON. LOUIS H. BURKE t
I.

WHAT IT IS.

The Children's Court of Conciliation is a regular department
of the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of Los Angeles. Its purpose is to preserve and protect family life and the institution of matrimony and to provide means for
the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic and family controversies.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

The law authorizing formation of a Children's Court of California was enacted in 1939, and the first court in California under
the new law was officially opened on September 26 of that year in
Los Angeles.
The law was patterned after the French Conciliation Law of
1886 and the Wisconsin statutes of 1933 creating a department of
conciliation as well as the Michigan statutes of 1919. The California law has been codified and consists of sections 1730-1772 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Save and except with respect to certain administrative matters provided for in the law, the original
statute has never been amended, and only in certain very minor
respects have its provisions ever been reviewed by any California
appellate courts.

III. EFFECTIVENESS.
Only a few of the metropolitan counties of the state have taken
advantage of the law and created a conciliation court, and even in
Los Angeles, where it has been in continuous operation since 1939,
it cannot be said that its procedures have made more than a substantial dent in the overall devastating and overwhelming divorce
picture. This can be seen by the fact that over 2000 divorce actions a month are filed in Los Angeles County, with only approximately 100 matters being referred to the Conciliation Court each
month.
In saying this I do not wish to infer that its operation has not
been worth while. Last year, for example, over 1200 Conciliation
Court actions were filed and reconciliations were affected in over
400 of such cases. There were 839 children involved in the cases
* Address given by Judge Burke at the Annual Convention of Colorado State
Bar Association, Colorado Springs, October 16, 1954.
t Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and Presiding Judge
of the Children's Court of Conciliation.
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where reconciliations were accomplished. This year, with a heavier
load, an even higher percentage of success is being achieved, with
reconciliations being effected in from 35 to 45 per cent of the cases
completed in the Conciliation Court.
The failure of the program to accomplish a more substantial
result in the light of the overall picture is due to several situations
which are incidental to the program and do not constitute basic
shortcomings of the plan itself. For example, in order to protect
the privacy of the children and families involved, the Court seals
the files. Consequently, practically no publicity results in the public
press, and only a small segment of the four and a half million people residing within the county are even aware that the Court exists.
A number of years ago some attorneys specializing in the
divorce field saw in the conciliation procedure a ready weapon to
delay the granting of temporary orders of alimony and child support in divorce proceedings by the filing of petitions for conciliation. This was done in many cases where there was no real desire
on the part of either party to consider reconciliation. Thus, the
Court became bogged down in proceedings which should never have
been brought before it, and in addition it suffered the disrespect
of a segment of the bar who felt that it was merely a stumbling
block.
This latter situation has been removed during the past year
by providing that the filing of a petition for reconciliation in a
previously filed divorce action shall not operate as a stay of proceedings in the divorce court. The conciliation proceedings take
place in their regular course, entirely independent of the securing
of temporary orders in the divorce proceedings. Robbed of their
value as a weapon of delay, we now find that proceedings are filed
in the Conciliation Court only in cases where at least one of the
parties has a real desire to effect a reconciliation. I have taken
pains to give you this picture so that I may not create the impression that our conciliation process has proven a panacea for the alleviation of divorce evils in our state. On the other hand, I want
to stress that in my opinion it provides a vehicle under which a
tremendous amount of good has been accomplished and in which
I have very strong hopes for the future.
A question with which we are often met in estimating the
effectiveness of the work of the court is, "How long do these reconciliations last?" Previous estimates of officials of the court indicate
that in approximately two-thirds of the cases where reconciliations
are effected the parties remain reconciled. In one third they part
again at some later date. In my surveys of the work of the court
during the past year we have found that after a six-months interval from 75 to 85 per cent of the reconciled couples are still reconciled, which is most encouraging.

IV. THE PROCEDURE OF THE COURT.
Prior to or after the filing of any action for divorce either
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spouse or both may file a petition in the Conciliation Court. The
forms are provided at the expense of the County and the law provides that no fees shall be charged for the filing or for the performance of any duty by any officers pursuant to the law. Upon the
filing a notice goes out inviting the parties to attend an informal
conference before a commissioner to assist in adjusting any difficulties which may exist in the home. In the event the petition is
filed in a matter where a divorce action has previously been filed
then copies of the notice go to the attorneys of record as well as
to the parties. If necessary, the Court issues a citation to any respondent to require him to appear.
The hearing is conducted informally as a conference or a series
of conferences. With the consent of both of the parties the Court
may also invoke the aid of physicians, psychiatrists or of the pastors of any religious denominations to which the parties may belong. Such aid, however, is not at the expense of the County.
Where the petition is filed before a divorce action is instituted
it operates as a stay of the filing of any divorce proceedings for a
period of 30 days. This was intended no doubt to provide a "cooling off" period to avert formal action if possible.
At the first conference the commissioner advises the parties
that the Court does not have the jurisdiction to compel them to do
anything that they do not agree to do. Their co-operation, however, is enlisted for the purpose of reviewing the marriage and the
difficulties which have arisen, in an effort to ascertain in a friendly,
objective manner if an agreement can be worked out for the eventual reconciliation of the parties. Great stress is laid upon the effect of divorce on the children of the marriage. After having apprised the parties of the approach of the Court to the problem, one
of the parties is asked to withdraw temporarily and the other is
interviewed as to his views of the marriage.
Counsel for the opposing party is not permitted to be present
when the examination is made of the other party. Attorneys are
quick to appreciate the fact that the proceedings are in the nature
of a compromise or settlement, and that nothing that is to be said
is to be used in any subsequent arms-length proceeding between
the parties. Attorneys are very helpful in assisting the Court in
getting the case history of their own clients, and my experience
has been that they are extremely co-operative in their attempts to
aid the Court in effecting reconciliation, particularly where there
are children involved.
After the commissioner has a preliminary view of both sides
of the problem, both parties are brought in and the commissioner
advises them of his appraisal of the situation. If deemed advisable,
further conferences are held in order to afford a little more time
for reflection by the parties and for "cooling off". Often temporary
separations are suggested in order to provide for a more clear-
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headed view of the situation. If one or more of the parties refuses
reconciliation, then the proceedings are terminated.
At the first conference, or at a subsequent conference, when
the parties are ready for it, a reconciliation agreement is worked
out. In order to facilitate this process I have prepared forms for
such an agreement containing many alternate paragraphs on every
phase of domestic trouble which has occurred to us. The pertinent
pages and paragraphs can be quickly assembled and with minor
interlineations can be handed to the parties to read. Each paragraph prescribes a rule of conduct designed to aid in the solving of
a particular problem, and viewed from its entirety the agreement
provides a marital plan, which if adhered to should avoid many of
the common pitfalls of marriage.
When an agreement has been reached the parties execute the
document, being forewarned that the Court will make its order
requiring them to comply fully with the terms of their agreement.
For failure to so comply they are advised that they may be held
in contempt of court and subjected to fine and imprisonment to the
same extent and in the same manner as is provided by law for
failure to comply with any court order. While the parties are still
in the office a copy of the agreement is taken in to the judge for
approval, the order is signed and copies of the order are served
upon the parties. A copy of the agreement and order is supplied
to the parties.
Contempt proceedings may later be invoked if there is a willful violation of some material part of the agreement. Contempt
proceedings are only permitted to be instituted after the charges
have been carefully screeened as, obviously, many of the provisions
of such an agreement are not susceptible of contempt proceedings.
On the other hand, such matters as restraints against physical
violence, limitations upon drinking, gambling, child abuse, absence
from home, lack of support are susceptible of such proceedings,
and in appropriate cases parties have been sent to jail for the willful violation of their agreements and the Court order. I instituted
this procedure of a written agreement and a formal court order in
order to dignify and formalize the promises made by parties who
desire a reconciliation which, experience has shown, are sometimes
insincerely made merely to accomplish the objective of forgiveness
and reconciliation.
The first conferences are usually held by a commissioner or a
counselor. If such official believes that a conference by the parties
with the judge of the department would be helpful to solve a particular situation, such a conference is scheduled for the judge, and
the parties are ordered to return. At present I spend approximately one day a week conducting such conferences, although, at
the inception of my study of the department, I devoted my entire
time to the holding of such conferences in order to get some understanding of the problems and of their solution, following which
were developed the forms which are in use in the department.
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In addition to the time spent in conferences, at the present
time we reserve on our court calendar from 9 to 10 a.m. of every
court day for the hearing of orders to show cause in connection
with the issuance of restraining orders, orders for temporary support, attorneys' fees, etc. and for the holding of contempt proceedings.
The remainder of the judge's time is devoted to civil non-jury
trials which have no connection with the work of the Conciliation
Court.
The law provides that the Court shall have jurisdiction over
all persons having any relation to the domestic controversy involved, as well as over the particular spouses. It also provides that
any person who has any relation to the controversy may be named
in the proceedings as a respondent. In view of these provisions,
third-party "paramours" or in some instances even "in-laws" are
named as respondents and brought into the proceedings.
Where a domestic triangle exists and the husband and wife
involved agree that they want to forgive and forget and start over
again, upon the condition that the erring spouse will not consort
any further with the third party, then the Court makes its order
to that effect. Quite often our experience has been that the third
party, having been brought into the proceedings much against his
cr her will, is only too pleased to join in a consent that the Court
may make its order that such parties shall not consort with one
another thereafter. In one such instance the wife brought a subsequent contempt proceeding before our Court, and after a hearing
thereon, the erring spouse and the third party were found to be in
contempt of the court order and were sent to jail. As far as I
know, this is the first time that an erring spouse and the "homebreaker" have gone to jail for such conduct and it brings to mind
a recent article emanating from London to the effect that a weekly
Church of England newspaper editorial commenting on homebreakers recently stated that, "Again it seems strange that the guilty
co-respondent is allowed so often to go scot-free. A man who breaks
open a safe is sent to prison, a man can destroy a home and cause
untold misery and not be guilty of any criminal offense at all. In
many cases a term of imprisonment would be a more fitting punishment and would act as a deterrent to other homebreakers."
While our action in the case mentioned appears to have done
just that, it is important that it be not misunderstood. The result
was accomplished only where the husband, the wife and the third
party consented to the making of the order. Had the parties refused to consider a reconciliation, then under our law our hands
would have been tied and the order could not have been made. This
is in harmony with the basic theory of our law that we do not
attempt to force married people to live together but only implement
reconciliations by suggesting rules for future conduct which after
they are agreed upon are made the subject of a court order. We
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thereby supply the injured party with some assurance that the
erring party or both of them will not resume the same misconduct
which brought about the separation. In some few instances the
paramours have refused to consent to the order against future
consorting, but in such instances, where the erring spouse has
nevertheless consented to the order, the Court admonishes the third
party that the erring spouse will be under the mandate of the Court
and that for failure to comply therewith will be subject to fine or
imprisonment or both.
V.

PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT.

At the present time the personnel of the Department consists
of a judge of the Superior Court who is designated by his fellow
judges annually to preside in the Conciliation Department (with
our 4,800,000 population there are now 80 judges of the court who
participate in this selection), the regular staff for the conduct of
its civil non-jury matters consisting of court clerk, bailiff and court
reporter, and a court commissioner, a counselor and a clerical staff
consisting of two clerks and a secretary.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS.
I have been asked to express my personal views as to the handling of the overall divorce problems. In this connection may I state
the following conclusions.
(a) The mere filing of divorce papers with all of the harsh
legal language which they entail decreases greatly the possibilities
of effecting reconciliations. I would favor, therefore, a requirement
in the law that persons desiring to file a divorce or separate maintenance action be required first to file a declaration of intention to
so proceed. In conjunction with the declaration of intention it
would be necessary to provide for the making of interim orders to
preserve the peace, to provide for support, attorney's fees, etc.
(b) I believe that it should be mandatory that in every case
where children are involved the matter should be referred to a conciliation court established along the lines of our own Court in order
to ascertain if it is possible to work out a reconciliation agreement.
I would not give that court any more powers than the basic powers
which our department now has. It would be there merely to attempt to conciliate; to afford the opportunity of a hearing of the
controversy by a neutral third party who is charged with the responsibility of the State of doing whatever is possible to protect
the children of such marriage.
(c) I believe it would be well to prohibit the filing of the
actual complaint setting forth the alleged grounds of divorce or
separation until at least 60 days after the date of filing the declaration of intention, thereby affording a "cooling off" period.
(d) Such a law should also provide that no hearing of the
divorce or separate maintenance action could be had by default or
otherwise for a period of 6 months from the date of filing of the
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declaration of intention. I believe that the provision in the law
for such a waiting period before the hearing of the divorce action
would be far more effective in promoting an avenue for reconciliation than is the California plan of providing a year interlocutory
period between the initial decree and the final judgment of divorce.
Our experience indicates that in cases which are referred to us by
the trial courts to attempt to work out reconciliation, our percentage of success is very substantially lower than in. cases referred
to us before the matter has been prepared or presented for trial.
(e) Finally, I believe that the duty of the enforcement of
child support orders should be imposed upon an arm of the court
or some other public agency. Recently the California Director of
Social Welfare asserted that fathers who desert or do not support
their children are costing the state about $50,000,000 a year under
the State's Aid to Needy Children program. He stated that there
are 35,000 non-supporting fathers in California of whom from 15
to 20 thousand cannot be located by law enforcement officials. Of
these fathers over 10,000 are divorced.
Several other states are doing an excellent job in providing for
the enforcement of support payments ordered by the court in
domestic relations cases. We also have some precedent for delegating such a duty to the probation officer in California since under
our juvenile law, where a child is placed by order of the court in
a foster home and the court orders a parent to support such child,
the responsibility for the enforcement of such support payments
is placed on the shoulders of the probation officer. Records indicate that this enforcement has been very effective, whereas in the
ordinary divorce case where enforcement is left to the individuals
there is a high percentage of default in the making of support payments and ultimately the burden shifts to' the State in many cases.
May I add one further personal note on the divorce problem
in general. My experience in domestic relations matters in the
past several years has led me to conclude that there is a basic cause
of divorce which is not usually accorded a place in the ordinary
compilation of statistics of divorce causes, such as infidelity, cruelty,
alcoholism, financial distress, etc. This cause, I would say, is a
lack of religion. Without attempting to make a speech on the subject, it has been increasingly apparent to me that what George
Washington said in his farewell address, of the two firmest props
of our form of government, namely, religion and morality, could
well be said of the institution of marriage. Where marriage is
entered into by two people solely upon the materialistic basis, it
stands to reason that its future course will likewise be judged on
the basis of materialistic values.
The parties entering into a marriage contract to which their
Creator is not a party are likely to do so without any pre-marriage
counsel or preparation for their new responsibilities. This is not
true of a marriage performed by a member of the cloth, who coun-
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sels the members of his flock in such matters before the marriage
is performed. In such a marriage the word "love" is almost synonymous with the word "sacrifice". The marriage affords two individuals opportunities of serving each other. It is neither a marriage for purposes of utility or for purposes of pleasure, although
it may well result in such blessings. Unlike marriages entered into
solely for utility and pleasure purposes, the marriage entered into
where the spirit of sacrifice plays a part is likely to endure through
all kinds of adversities, since adversity merely affords greater opportunities for such persons to shower their blessings upon one another. Marriage entered into solely for utility purposes or purposes of pleasure, as all other types of materialistic marriages, are
more likely to fall apart at the seams when the utility purpose or
the pleasure diminishes, as is likely to be the case when hard times
or adversities strike.
It is my observation, therefore, that what is most needed to
cure the evil of divorce is a resurgence of religion and a more mature approach to the responsibilities entailed in a contract of marriage; a contract to which Almighty God should be not only a spectator but a necessary and vital party.

"While it is cheap wit for many to say sneering things of our
profession,yet, if you strike from Anglo-Saxon history the thoughts
and deeds of her lawyers you rob it of more than half its glory.
Blot from American society today the lawyer with all the work
that he does and all the power he exerts, and you leave society as
dry and shifting as the sands that sweep over Sahara. For the mystic force that binds our civilization together and makes possible its
successes and glories in the law, and they who minister at its shrine
and keep alive its sacred fires, are you and I and that vast multitude
of our co-workers who boast no higher title than of lawyer."
JUSTICE DAVm

J. BREWER

ATTENTION SUBSCRIBER!
As announced in the July issue, the 30 year subject-author
index to DICTA is ready for your use. The students and attorneys
who have compiled the information feel that this publication will
be an invaluable aid in your library. This 85 page booklet, at a
printing cost to us of $2.00, is being made available to you as a
service of DICTA with no attempt to profit therefrom.
We sincerely solicit your support.
Thank you,
V. G. SEAVY, JR., Managing Editor.
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COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
By MYRON MILLER*

At Common Law no formal ceremony is essential to a valid
marriage, and an agreement between the parties per verba de praesenti to be husband and wife, there and then, constitutes a valid
marriage, no other ceremony being necessary. The validity of
such common-law marriage was recognized at an early date in our
American jurisprudence.1
EARLY HISTORY

Under the canon law, the contract of marriage was regarded
simply as consensual in nature, differing from other contracts only
in its being indissoluble even by the consent of the parties. No
ceremony or religious sacrament was required by this law, which
was regarded in England as the Common Law of marriages. While
the church elevated marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, it respected its natural and civil origin, and did not absolutely require
the intervention of a priest. This canon law was changed by the
decree of the Council of Trent in 1563, which declared void any
marriage not solemnized by a priest in the presence of witnesses.
But it was not within the power of an ecclesiastical decree to affect the status or civil relations of persons. This could only be
affected by the supreme civil power. The church might punish by
her censures those who disregarded her ordinances, but until the
decree of the Council was adopted and confirmed by the civil power,
the offspring of a clandestine marriage, which was ecclesiastically
void, would be held as canonically legitimate. The decree never
became effective in England, since that country, at the Reformation, disclaimed the doctrine of a sacrament in marriage, and retained those rules of the canon law which had their foundation, not
in the sacrament nor in any religious view of the subject, but in the
natural and civil contract. The canon and civil laws as they were
administered in England were brought here by the early settlers of
this country, and were regarded by them as parts of the Common
Law, and those laws have been adopted and used in all cases to
which they were applicable 2whenever there have been conditions
existing to call for their use.
THE ELEMENTS OF COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE

Consent
In order to constitute a valid common-law marriage there must
be a contract or mutual agreement, that is to say a contract or
mutual agreement to enter into a matrimonial relation or to become
husband and wife; or, as frequently laid down, a contract or mutual
agreement to enter into a matrimonial relation or to become
husband and wife presently or as of the time of the contract or
* Student, University of Denver, College of Law.
135 A. J. 198, §128.
2 35 A. J. 201.
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agreement, with resultant obligations of husband and wife. The
contract or mutual agreement must be between persons capable in
law of making such a contract or agreement and must contemplate
a permanent union, exclusive of all others. A common-law marriage
differs from a ceremonial marriage with respect to the method of
expressing consent. The consent of the parties must be unequivocally evidenced, but it may be evidenced in any form -or manner,
either verbally, including expression either orally or in writing,
or by conduct alone. No particular form of expression is necessary.
It need not be manifested in the presence of witnesses.
An example of the Colorado decisions on this element is to be
found in Klipfel v. Klipfel 3as follows:
A marriage simply by the agreement of the parties
followed by cohabitation of the parties as husband and
wife, and such other attendant circumstances as are
necessary to constitute what is termed a common-law marriage may be valid and binding.
Also, actual words of agreement and consent are not always necessary to create a common-law marriage, 4 and the mutual consent
may be inferred from cohabitation and repute. 5 Another case has
held that when admitting the habit and repute of marriage while admitting the absence of consent and contract, the law will hold the
relationship adulterous.6 The Radovich case 7 states that the agreement must be in the present and not the future, as evidenced by
these words:
It is true that a mere contract for a future marriage
can never amount to a common-law marriage even though
followed by years of cohabitation and that a plan for a
future ceremony is sometimes incompatible with a present marriage, but an agreement in praesenti to be now
and henceforth husband and wife may be valid even
though there is then an agreement for a future ceremony.
And an agreement, made after a valid marriage, to have
a ceremony, cannot vitiate the marriage.
Therefore, it is easily concluded that Colorado requires a consensual agreement, as confined by these cases briefly set out.
Cohabitation
Cohabitation is another one of the essentials for a valid common-law marriage. Cohabitation is not a mere gratification of
sexual passion, or casual commerce between man and woman, and
no presumption can elevate concubinage of whatever duration to
the dignity of marriage. When the cohabitation is not clearly
matrimonial (when the circumstances are ambiguous or suspicious.
341 Colo. 40, 92 P. 26 (1907).
4 James v. James, 97 Colo. 413, 50 P. (2d) 63 (1935).
5 Smith v. People, 64 Colo. 290, 170 P. 959 (1918).
0
Peters v. Peters, 73 Colo. 271, 274, 215 P. 128 (1923).
1 Radovich v. Radovich, 84 Colo. 250, 269 P. 22 (1928).
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or the evidence meager), evidence of repute is quite essential to
give character to an ambiguous relation or to colorless circumstances.8 Where the relationship between a man and woman is
meretricious, it affords no basis for a common-law marriage.9
Yet some jurisdictions hold the fact that the relations of the parties
were at first illicit or meretricious does not prevent them from
afterwards contracting a valid common-law marriage. Whether
the parties intend to convert their meretricious relationship into
a common-law marriage is determinable from their conduct. 10
Cohabitation is clearly an element in Colorado, and has been so
stated from as early as 1897 and subsequent cases. 1 ' It is interesting to note that cohabitation is presumed 2to be matrimonial-a
presumption of fact, not of law in Colorado.'
Consummation
It is generally conceded that the agreement must be consummated. A Colorado case states that admitting the existence
of the contract and its consummation, and the absence of habit
and repute (reputation in this use) the law will uphold the marriage relation. 13 Thus, the writer is left with the impression that
consummation is an essential element in Colorado.
Repute
Although in some jurisdictions repute is deemed an element
of common-law marriage, it is not one of the essentials in Colorado. In the Klipfel case it is stated that by general reputation and
repute is meant the understanding among the neighbors and acquaintances with whom the parties associate in their daily life,
that they are living together as husband and wife and not in
meretricious intercourse.' 4 A later Colorado case has stated that
while habit and repute of marriage are not essential to the legality
of the relationship, evidence thereof is always competent and in
itself properly may be the basis for inferring consent to a contract
of marriage. 15 It has also been stated that in cases where the contract or agreement is denied and cannot be shown, its existence
may be proved by, and presumed from, evidence of cohabitation
as husband and wife and general repute. 16 Therefore, it can be
concluded that repute is a means of establishing the primary element of consent, and possibly the other two elements.
SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
As far as could be ascertained, 30 of the 48 states do not
835 A. J. 328, §221.
*Pickett v. Pickett, 114 Colo. 59, 161 P. (2d) 520 (1945).
20Supra, note 8.
"Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. App. 303, 50 P. 1049 (1897); Klipfel v. Kllpfel,
41 Colo. 40, 92 P. 26 (1907); Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis. v.
Industrial Comm., 124 Colo. 68, 234 P. (2d) 901 (1951); and others.
"Foley v. Gavin, 76 Colo. 286, 230 P. 618 (1924).
"Peters v. Peters, 73 Colo. 271, 215 P. 128 (1923).
24Supra, note 11.
"Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 108 Colo. 388, 118 P. (2d) 769 (1941).
18Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. App. 303, 50 P. 1049 (1897).
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allow common-law marriages to be formed in their jurisdiction. 17
It is obvious then that the trend has been away from common-law
marriages. We can ask ourselves why, and arguments for both
sides quickly appear.
Those advocating common-law marriage have three main
arguments:
1. Where no ceremony is employed and no record is made to
attest the marriage, the protection of the parties (mainly their
children) coupled with considerations of public policy require
some public recognition of such an arrangement as evidence of its
existence.
2. An older argument, which was re-affirmed by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in its proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,18 is that men and
women of full age have the right to marry and to found a family.
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage
and at its dissolution. Furthermore, marriage shall be entered into
only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. It is
then contended that the only consent necessary should be the parties and that if they so consent and assume the duties and obligations of marriage, that such a marriage should be sanctioned and
deemed valid.
3. The third argument is the familiar argument that if the
parties were together through sickness, health, etc., and actually
lived in the same manner as they would have if they had gone
through a ceremony, then why should the mere failing of a ceremony deprive the parties of the status of marriage.
A good argument against common-law marriage is presented
in 39 A.L.R. 547, which states as follows:
It has been said that there was a time, perhaps, when
the doctrine of a liberal construction of the testimony and
the slight proof of a common-law marriage subserved a
useful purpose, but that time is now passed, especially
since the legislature has undertaken to provide for the
formal solemnization of the marriage rites and to have
the fact of marriage preserved in records provided for
that purpose. This ancient doctrine is alien to the ideas
and customs of our people. It tends to weaken the public
estimate of the sanctity of the marriage relation. It puts
in doubt the certainty of the rights of inheritance. It
opens the door to false pretenses of marriage and the imposition upon estates of supposititous heirs. It places honest, God-ordained matrimony and mere meretricious cohabitation too nearly on a level with each other.
Keezer 19 feels that where two persons intend to form a union
for life they can have no reasonable excuse for concealing the fact
Keezer, ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVoRcE, 3rd Ed. (1946).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16 (1) (2).
'9 Keezer, MARRIAGE AND Divoc,
3rd Edition, §§29, 30.

'U.N.
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from the rest of the world, for the celebration can be obtained with
little expense. Then there is always difficulty in determining
whether persons so loosely joined together are married or not, and
it requires very unpleasant and expensive litigation to determine
the question. He also feels common-law marriages furnish a means
of defeating the effectiveness of reform sought to be brought about
through legislation. Laws requiring pre-marital physical examinations are rendered ineffective. It cheapens marriage and gives
instability to the home. Common-law marriage is seldom availed
of to protect children from the bane of illegitimacy. Other effective
means are being devised to protect such unfortunates. He concludes by stating that the pioneer conditions which fostered common-law marriage in the United States have disappeared.
Briefly stated, these are some of the arguments concerning
common-law marriage. When one considers the prevailing system
of statutory formality and records reflecting the present increase of
interest on the part of the state and society in the institution of
marriage, it would seem an anachronism that some eighteen American states are willing to recognize the validity of a marriage
solely on the basis of the statement by a man and a woman that
they are husband and wife. Such a practice must be conducive of
instability in marriage and thus fosters the very evil which the
statutory requirements of license issuance, registration and public
administration were designed to prevent. Of necessity the standard of record for all marriages is thereby lowered. The difficulty
is increased by the fact that no two states are in entire accord as
to what constitutes a common-law marriage.
Nevertheless, there is a deep rooted sentiment in various parts
of the country in favor of the institution. This is due to the feeling that innocent children ought not to suffer because their parents have neglected the statutory formalities and that the refusal
of sanction to an informal union constitutes an invasion of the
most sacred right of the individual. It is true that by means of
a common-law marriage many marriages are upheld which otherwise due to some impediment would be void. Frequently, however,
the judicial determination of the common law relationship comes
at so late a date-often after the death of one or both of the parties,
when the evidence is difficult to obtain-that there is little truth in
the popular idea that it furnishes "protection". The existence of
common-law marriage often opens the door to blackmail. After
the death of a man it is frequently possible for his mistress to
claim the rights of a common-law wife. On the other hand, if the
claims based upon illicit relations are presented during the lives
of the parties, a subsequent ceremonial marriage of one of them
may be made bigamous and the children bastardized. The recognition of common-law marriages thus involves fundamental moral
and practical dilemmas. 20 And the question remains, should common-law marriage be abolished?
" Encyclopedia of the Social Science, Vol. IV, P. 57.
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TORTS
FRANK A. BUCHANAN of the Boulder Bar

During the past year the Colorado Supreme Court has written
opinions in a variety of fact situations 'involving the application
of the law of torts, including a case for malicious prosecution, two
malpractice suits, suits for libel, for civil conspiracy, and for fraud,
three cases considering falls on sidewalks and one a fall in a rest
room, an electrocution case, and eight cases arising out of automobile accidents, of which five were controlled by the Guest Statute.
Both cases against physicians for malpractice were reversed
in spite of the fact that in each case the plaintiff had obtained a
jury verdict in his favor. In Lamme v. Ortega,' the doctor's attorneys were able to persuade the appellate court that the plaintiff's
own testimony and his own witnesses failed to prove the facts he
alleged. The plaintiff had attempted to prove that he had been injured by the defendant's use of X-ray and fluoroscope machines
in probing for a bullet in his leg. The Supreme Court said that
the burden of proving a causal connection between the defendant's
acts and the alleged injury "is not met by showing that it might
have resulted from the operations complained of, and jurors should
not be left to conjecture as to the efficient and proximate cause."
In the other malpractice suit, Maercklein and Postma v.
Smith, 2 the plaintiff Smith and his wife had hired the defendants,
licensed physicians and surgeons, to perform a circumcision. Instead of the operation requested, a vasectomy was performed, rendering the plaintiff sterile and causing him to suffer in various
other ways enumerated in the complaint, to his damage. In July,
1953, the Supreme Court issued an opinion 3 dismissing the entire
suit on the grounds that more than one year had elapsed since the
"assault and battery" and therefore the action was barred by the
Statute of Limitations, 4 two judges dissenting. A rehearing was
granted, the original opinion withdrawn, and this opinion issued.
This time the Supreme Court dismissed the case only as to surgeon
Postma, who had been hired by the defendant Dr. Maercklein, the
general practitioner, on the grounds that surgeon Postma had performed the operation skillfully and had been assured by defendant
Maercklein that written consent by both the plaintiff and his wife
had been obtained. In actual fact, no written consent had been obtained. The Court remanded the case, ordering a new trial to
determine the liability of defendant Maercklein, ruling as follows:
(1) Where a different operation than that ordered is
performed, the action, regardless of the form of the pleading,
is one based in negligence and not assault and battery. The
1267 P. 2d 1175, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 10, p. 207.
2266 P. 2d 1095, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 9, p. 188.
' 1952-53 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 26, p. 416.
4 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 102, §2 (1935).
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two year Statute of Limitations,5 not the one year Statute, is
applicable.
(2) The trial court erred in permitting only the matter
of damages to be determined by the jury-holding that there
is no statute or rule of law requiring written consent to be
obtained before performing this or any other type of operation and that the terms of employment were here a disputed
question of fact, to be determined by the jury. Defendant
Maercklein's liability is determined by a jury's answer to the
question: What operation had the plaintiff's wife, as the plaintiff's agent, with the plaintiff's knowledge and consent, in
actual fact ordered-circumcision or sterilization? 6
In the malicious prosecution case, Montgomery Ward v. Pherson,7 the Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict, finding as a matter of law that the defendants had probable cause, acted without
malice, and were entitled to rely upon the advice of the district
attorney in instigating the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff.
The Court recognized the difficulty a jury has comprehending how
a person found innocent in the criminal proceeding may not be
able to recover. The Court ruled that where the facts are conceded
or substantially undisputed, probable cause is a question of law
for the trial court. In so stating, the Supreme Court observed
further as follows:
An innocent person may be prosecuted unjustly, and
subjected to the expense and disgrace incident thereto
with no right to call the prosecutor to account, provided
he acted upon an honest and reasonable belief in commencing the proceeding complained of. One may act on
what appears to be true, even if it turns out to be false,
provided he believes it to be true and the appearances
are sufficient to justify the belief as reasonable.
It is for the best interests of society that those who
offend against the laws of the state shall be promptly punished, and that any citizen who has reasonable grounds
to believe that the law has been violated shall have the
right to cause the arrest of the person whom he honestly
and in good faith believes to be the offender. For the purpose of protecting him in so doing, it is the generally established rule that if he has reasonable grounds for his
belief, and acts thereon in good faith in causing the arrest, he shall not be subjected to damages merely because
the accused is not convicted. The rule is founded on the
grounds of public policy in order to encourage the exposure of crime.
6 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 102, §7 (1935).
6 See also Bates v. Newman, 264 P. 2d 197, for unusual damage.
'272 P. 2d 643, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 15, p. 363.
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The Court also expressed the rule of law that it is a complete defense to such a suit if the criminal proceeding was advised by a
district attorney after a good faith, full afid fair disclosure of all
the facts had been made to him. In discussing this principle, the
Court stated as follows:
It is the common duty of every citizen to report to the
legally constituted authorities every violation of the law,
to the end that the law may be enforced; . . . if the complaining party states the facts fully and fairly to the
district attorney, and that officer incorrectly determines
that such facts constitute a crime, and proceeds to formulate the necessary papers to set on foot the prosecution,
the complaining party is not liable, since the fault is not
his, but that of the officer.
If the officers of the state, who are appointed on account of their legal learning, consider that a given state
of facts is sufficient evidence or probable cause, how can
a private citizen be said to be in fault in acting upon such
facts, and how can the state condemn him to damages for
so doing? To decide so is to use the machinery of government as a trap to ensnare those who trust in government
for such matters, and who ought to trust in it.
Hadden v. Gateway West Publishing Company 8 is the libel
suit. A past member of the now famous Board of Education of
Jefferson County tangled with the Jefferson Sentinel. In affirming
a jury verdict for the defendants, the Supreme Court declared that
irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent hearsay testimony, in order to be grounds for reversal, must also be shown to have been
prejudicial. Because of the special provisions of our State Constitution 9 concerning truth as a defense in suits for libel, the Court
ruled that a general denial to the allegations that the defendants
had published articles which were "false, defamatory, untrue and
libelous" included the defense that the matters published were true.
In Lockwood Grader Corporationv. Bockhaus,10 the defendant
asserted, in his answer to the plaintiff's suit to foreclose a mortgage securing an admitted debt, a counterclaim for actual and
exemplary damages resulting from the plaintiff's conspiracy to
force him out of business. Apparently, a soft hearted creditorplaintiff in effect financed the debtor defendant for a number of
years and became so entwined that he found it difficult to get
untangled. In fact, the jury found for the debtor--defendant on his
counterclaim, for $500.00 actual damages and $3,000.00 exemplary
damages. The Supreme Court failed to find any evidence to support the jury verdict, reversed it and stated that to constitute a
8 273 P. 2d 733, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 17, p. 437.
'COLO. CONST. Art. II, §10.
10270 P. 2d 193, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 13, p. 298.
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civil conspiracy, there must be (1) two or more persons (and for
this purpose a corporation is a person) ; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action;
(4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result thereof.
In Platte Valley Motor Company, Inc. v. Wayne," the plaintiffs, beet farmers, had purchased a beet harvesting machine which
they alleged would not harvest beets, and sued both the seller and
the manufacturer on the implied warranty that the machine was
reasonably suited for the purpose for which it was designed and
sold. The Supreme Court summarized the pleading of both defendants by saying that it was a case of the kettle calling the pot
black, and observed that the plaintiffs agreed with both defendants on this score. The Supreme Court found both the pot and the
kettle to be bla~k, for they reversed and remanded for a new trial
and ruled that under the Uniform Sales Act 12 both the distributor
and the manufacturer gave an implied warranty that goods are
reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are purchased. The
case is also authority that an amended complaint relates back to
the time of filing of the original complaint. The Statute of Limitations 13 does not bar a claim for damages for fraud and misrepresentation if the claim arose out of facts originally pleaded, even
though the statutory period elapsed since the happening of the
events giving rise thereto if, as in this case, the original complaint
had been filed within the period.
The most important of the sidewalk cases is Parker v. City
and County of Denver.14 In this case, the Supreme Court reversed
all of its prior decisions insofar as they may have established a
definite or mathematical rule as to the depth of a depression or
elevation in a sidewalk necessary to constitute actionable negligence against a municipality. The usual rules of negligence are
substituted for a mathematical formula, and it is stated that a
reasonably safe sidewalk is to be henceforth determined by the
amount of travel, the location of the depression or elevation, the
nature of the area, and any other circumstances of the particular
case, as well as the "measured" depth or elevation over which a
plaintiff may have stumbled. The decision was en bane, with
Mr. Justice Holland dissenting. As Justice Holland points out in
his dissenting opinion, the majority decision is not clear as to
whether or not a depression or elevation less than one and threeeighths inches remains as a matter of law not actionable. This
writer believes that the proper role of the jury and the usual principles of negligence have been restored to the sidewalk cases.
In Clark v. Joslin Dry Goods,'5 the second sidewalk case, the
1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 17, p. 433.
STAT. ANN., c. 143A, §15(1) (1935).
"COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 102, §6 (1935).
262 P. 2d 553, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 3, p. 52.
262 P. 2d 546, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 2, p. 37.
"COLO.
14
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Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's direction of a verdict for
the defendant, holding that a 61 year old person weighing 285
pounds, while using a cane and carrying bundles, suffering from
high blood pressure and other ailments, cannot recover for injuries
suffered from a fall on a sidewalk on which she had observed little
rivulets of waste water from the washing of display windows, as
follows:
When a person travels along a sidewalk which he
knows to be dangerous, he cannot recover for injuries sustained resulting from defects of which he had knowledge,
unless he exercises care commensurate with the danger
about to be encountered, and his ability to cope with it.
The precautions which an ordinary prudent person in the
full possession of his physical faculties would take to
avoid danger would be wholly insufficient to protect one
from the same danger whose physical faculties were impaired.
In the third sidewalk case, Beezley v. Olson, 16 the Court ruled
that a sidewalk trowelled to a smooth surface is not an inherently
dangerous and unsafe condition simply because a pedestrian slipped and fell thereon during snowy and icy conditions. The Court
observed that in these sidewalk cases not every defect is actionable
but depends entirely upon all the circumstances of the case. Since
only slight defects and obstructions in sidewalks are sometimes not
actionable, the Supreme Court did not wish to affirm a decision
which permitted a smooth sidewalk to be actionable unless it were
also shown that the sidewalk was slippery at all times and not just
when wet or covered with ice. Note, however, that this suit was
not based on the theory that the defendant was negligent in failing to remove the ice and snow, but rather on the theory that
the trowelled smooth sidewalk was an inherently dangerous and
unsafe condition.
In Van Schaack v. Perkins,17 the plaintiff, a member of the
fair sex and of our learned profession, slipped and fell in the rest
room in the building in which she maintained her professional
offices. The janitor had left green liquid soap on the floor, making
it slippery. The defendants claimed they could not be held liable
because they had no notice or knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the dangerous condition. The Supreme Court differentiated between those situations where a dangerous condition exists in a
public building through no act of the landlord (in which case the
landlord is held liable for a user's injury only when the landlord
had actual notice or knowledge of the dangerous condition or the
condition had existed for such a length of time that in law he is
21270 P. 2d 758, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 14, p. 326.
'

272 P. 2d 269, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 16, p. 392.
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charged with constructive notice thereof) and those situations,
as here, where an agent of the owner of the building negligently
created the dangerous condition. In this latter instance, no actual
knowledge or constructive notice is necessary for a plaintiff to recover, and the verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed.
Jackson v. Mountain Utilities Corporation18 is an interesting
case. A pole of a mountain transmission line rotted and fell, and
blocked the plaintiff's driveway with high voltage lines. The plaintiff lived to bring suit after being electrocuted while trying to attach a rope to the pole to raise the lines and unblock the driveway.
The trial court had set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiff and
entered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed and
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that a plaintiff
cannot recover who was fully aware of the extreme danger surrounding contact with high voltage electrical wires, does not deny
that he had knowledge of the present danger, and while acting
under no emergency, assumed the risk. The Supreme Court further
held that the negligence of the defendant, that of failing to replace
a rotten pole, was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury,
when the plaintiff had observed the condition, assumed the risk,
and with full knowledge of the extreme danger nevertheless assumed to act. The Court found the plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
Many of the "friendly" suits now pending by a plaintiff guestpassenger to collect damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, allegedly caused by the wilful and wanton negligence of the owner-driver defendant, might just as well be dismissed with prejudice. In this past year the Supreme Court has
had occasion to consider five cases where a jury verdict had been
obtained for the guest-passenger. Four of the five were reversed.
The case of Pettingell v. Moede 19 provided an ideal fact situation for the Court to further construe the Guest Statute. The defendant was courting the plaintiff. She had accompanied him on
a hunting trip to the Western slope. While returning via Berthoud
Pass, the four wheel drive jeep equipped with snow tread tires
slipped off the road, injuring both parties. The plaintiff admitted
that the defendant was a careful driver and had not been drinking,
but asserted that driving 35 miles per hour on a slippery downgrade was wilful and wanton negligence. The Supreme Court
ruled that under these circumstances, the defendant was guilty of
nothing more than simple negligence. Because of the frequency
of errors in jury instructions in these cases, it seems proper to
quote directly from the decision the Court's ruling concerning the
words "wilful and wanton", as follows:
Under the guest statute, the facts must show more
than negligence. To wilfully and wantonly disregard the
Is 263 P. 2d 812, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 5, p. 103.
lo 271 P. 2d 1038, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 15, p. 358.
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rights of others requires a consciousness of heedless and
reckless conduct by which the safety of others is endangered. For the purpose of properly construing this statute,
ordinary or simple negligence should be considered as resulting from a passive mind, while a wilful and wanton
disregard expresses the thought that the action of which
complaint is made was the result of an active and purposeful intent. Wilful action means voluntary; by choice;
intentional; purposeful. Wantonness signifies an even
higher degree of culpability in that it is wholly disregardful of the rights, feelings and safety of others. It may,
at times, even imply an element of evil. One may be said
to be guilty of "wilful and wanton disregard" when he is
conscious of his misconduct, and although have no intent
to injure anyone, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions is aware that his conduct in the natural sequence of events will probably result in injury to his guest, and is unconcerned over the
possibility of such result. The word wanton is defined in
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.), as:
'Marked by or manifesting arrogant recklessness of justice, of the rights or feelings of others, or the like; . . .'
Synonyms given for it are capricious, wayward, spiteful.
To be 'wilful and wanton' there must be some affirmative
act purposefully committed which the actor must have
realized as dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to consequences, or of the rights and safety of
others, particularly the guest. To be so classified, conduct must be negative in both attention and concern; it
must demonstrate indifference as well as inattention to
consequences which may result.
The foregoing is rather to be expected. In framing instructions
in these cases, however, one is confronted with a defendant who
insists that he was not conscious of the danger to others when most
certainly he should have been. All prior decisions seemed to approve the phrase "or should have known" as qualifying the defendant's consciousness of the danger. This decision qualifies, overrules, and explains the previous decisions 20 in this regard, as
follows:
As a matter of fact, the phraseology under discussion
probably has been somewhat unfortunately expressed in
our former, opinions. In view of the previous discussion
herein of the meaning of 'wilful and wanton disregard',
wherein we have tried to make plain that this represents
a condition of the mind and requires an active rather
24 See, however, Bundy v. Bien, 269 P. 2d 707, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv., Sh., No.
12, p. 279.
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than a passive mental attitude, it is impossible to say
accurately that one 'should have known'. We thereby infer that he did not know, whereas the meaning of the
terms wilful and wanton expresses the thought that he
did know. Without doubt the thought that was intended
to be conveyed in the former opinions to which reference
has been made, relates to the principle that, where, from
the surrounding facts and circumstances, the jury may
rightfully determine that a reasonably prudent person
should have known the probable result of his reckless conduct, the jury may find by inference that the defendant
did know, regardless of the fact that he himself maintains
that he did not know. It is the same principle by which
the jury is enabled in various instances to determine from
all surrounding facts and circumstances the thought that
was in the mind of a defendant at a particular time. It
is the method by which intent is determined.
In the second case (Loeffler v. Crandall)21 another young woman
sued her suitor and the Supreme Court ruled that the sharing of
expenses of a vacation trip is merely incidental and does not constitute the "moving influence for the transportation", and therefore
the passenger remains a guest for the purpose of the statute; and
also, once it is established that the plaintiff was a "guest", the
plaintiff has the burden of proof to show he has a right to recover
under the restrictions or exceptions of the Statute. In Lewis v.
Oliver,22 the Supreme Court ruled that a jury must not be instructed concerning the definition of simple negligence if the trial
court determines that the Guest Statute controls liability. The last
case, Vick v. Zumwalt,23 holds that the owner of a family car is afforded the same statutory protection as controls liability between
the plaintiff and the driver. Thus if the Guest Statute bars recovery as between the passenger and the defendant's son who was
driving the car, it also bars recovery from the parent.
These cases, in addition to considering the Guest Statute, also
the following rules of law:
1. Remarks of counsel during final argument concerning the purport of evidence not adduced at trial are
grounds for a mistrial, the offending party to pay costs,
and instructions to24the jury to disregard such remarks do
not cure the error.
2. Implied consent of a head of a household for a
member of his household to use the family automobile can
be established only by competent evidence, direct or circumstantial, which actually proves customary or continued
270 P. 2d 769, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 14, p. 319.
271 P. 2d 1055, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 15, p. 356.
1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 18, p. 470.
See Footnote 22, supra.
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use of the automobile by such member of the household,
and cannot be established merely by facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable
person to believe
25
that actual consent had been given.
3. If a trial judge recognizes the necessity of further
consideration by a jury of its verdict or answers to interrogatories and re-submits the case for further jury
deliberation, this should be done by the judge without
comment or26 emphasis on any single phase or instruction
in the case.
The last three cases, Yockey Trucking v. Handy, 7 Book v.
Paddock,28 and Siefried v. Mosher,29 had similar fact situations, in
that each involved a collision of automobiles on our state highways.
The decisions were not reached by application of tort law, but simply
affirmed jury verdicts for the plaintiffs, on the premises that all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence are drawn in favor
of the verdict by an appellate court and in favor of the other party
by a trial court when it is asked to direct a verdict. The Yockey
Trucking case further stated that this rule of law is equally applicable to those situations where the facts are undisputed, if fair
minded persons may form different opinions and draw different
conclusions from the facts.

DAMAGES, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AND LABOR LAW
WINSTON W. WOLVINGTON. of the Denver Bar
DAMAGES

In the past year, four cases involving the general question of
damages have been decided by our Supreme Court. Two of the
cases deal with the question of the substantive right to damages
and two cases deal with the question of the proper measure of
damages.
In the case of Weng v. Schleiger,' several interesting questions
of damages were determined. Mr. and Mrs. Schleiger owned an
automobile jointly. They and their minor son, John, were in the
automobile when it was struck by the defendant's truck, causing
injuries to all three and damages to the car. All three brought an
action against defendant which contained causes of action -as follows: (1) a cause of action by Mr. and Mrs. Schleiger for the damage to the automobile; (2) a cause of action by Mrs. Schleiger for
the loss of support and companionship of her husband; (3) a cause
See Footnote
See Footnote
262 P. 2d 930,
267 P. 2d 247,
268 P. 2d 411,
'273 P. 2d 356,

23, supra.
22, supra.
1953-54 C. B.
1953-54 C. B.
1953-54 C. B.
1953-54 C. B.

A. Adv. Sh.,
A. Adv. Sh.,
A. Adv. Sh.,
A, Adv. Sh.

No. 4, p. 72.
No. 9, p. 196.
No. 10, p. 218.
No. 17.
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of action for the injuries to Mrs. Schleiger; and (4) a cause of action for injuries to the son John. This complaint was dismissed
under the District Court Rule for want of prosecution. Mrs.
Schleiger and son John moved for reinstatement of the case, which
motion was granted. Mr. Schleiger did not move to reinstate his
case. The case was tried to a jury which returned verdicts in favor
of Mrs. Schleiger in the sum of $8000 and in favor of son John in
the sum of $10,000. As to the first cause of action (property damage), the Court held, first, that the husband, being a joint owner
of the automobile, was an indispensable party, and since he was
dismissed from the case under the rule, the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the question of damages to the automobile. For
good measure, the Court also stated that the plaintiff had failed to
prove the value of the car before and after the accident and for
that reason also was not entitled to recovery on the first cause of
action. As to the second cause of action (loss of support and companionship of husband), the Court held that the defendant's motion to strike that casue of action should have been sustained and
that it was error to submit the question of damages to the wife for
loss of support and companionship of her husband to the jury,
even though by special interrogatory, the jury had said it granted
no damages on that cause of action. As to the third and fourth
causes of action (personal injuries to wife and son), the Court held
that if the major portion of the verdicts was based on these causes
of action, then the verdicts were not supported by the evidence,
there being no evidence of any permanent injury.
2
In Kling v. Phayer,
the Court held that in an automobile accident case in which one driver was killed but left no "heirs" surviving as the term "heir" is used in the wrongful death statute,
his administrator may bring an action against the other driver for
the amount of the funeral expenses.
In MeEntyre v. Jones,3 the question before the Court was
whether the damages in an action for the wrongful death of a
thirteen-year-old girl were excessive. The Court held damages in
such a case are to be measured, not for the period of the child's
minority, but for the period of the child's life expectancy, but confined to the expectancy of the parent or parents involved. In other
words, the Court said that parents are entitled to damages for loss
of services of a child during minority and for loss of support and
maintenance from him during the declining years of life. The
Court also held that funeral expenses are a proper element of damage in a wrongful death action even though not specially pleaded.
The final case under this heading is Ark-Valley Alfalfa Mills
v. Day,4 wherein the Court held that the damages awarded to the
plaintiffs were excessive. James E. Day, who had bruises on his

1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 18.
3 263 P. 2d 313, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
4 263 P. 2d 815, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
2
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chest and left knee, nervousness and a bump on his head, was
awarded $1517 actual damages and $1000 exemplary damages. Inez
Day, who suffered a cut on her head, had black and blue knees, and
claimed she was upset and suffered nervous headaches, was awarded
$1200 actual and $1000 exemplary damages. Eileen Day, who had
a cut on her head and claimed nervousness, was awarded $600 actual and $500 exemplary damages. There was no evidence of any
permanent disability to any of the plaintiffs. The Court restated
the well-established rule that if exemplary damages are awarded,
they must bear some relation to the compensatory damages.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Eleven cases have been determined by our Supreme Court in
the past year involving situations arising under Chapter 97 Colorado Statutes Annotated. Eight of the cases fall under what is
commonly known as the Workmen's Compensation Act. Two fall
under the heading of unemployment compensation. One falls under
the Occupational Disease Act. The cases will be considered in that
order.
The cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act will be considered in the order in which the sections of the statute that they
deal with appear.
In IndustrialCommission v. Pacific Employers Insurance Company,5 and Montgomery Ward, Inc. v. Industrial Commission,6 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the well established principle that findings of fact by the Industrial Commission which are supported by
competent evidence will not be disturbed by the courts on review.
The former case involved a claimant who had hemorrhoids which
did not bother him; in fact, he didn't know he had them. While at
work, he pulled on a wrench, felt a pain in his groin, and on emerging from his working place, noticed for the first time that he had
hemorrhoids which caused him some discomfort and pain. A doctor's report introduced in evidence stated flatly that the strain did
not cause the hemorrhoids but that it was probably responsible
for the symptoms as described. The Commission found that the
claimant's hemorrhoids were aggravated by the strain. The Court
held that the claimant's testimony and the medical report constituted some evidence of aggravation of a pre-existing condition and
the award was affirmed. The latter case involved a claimant who
fell from ladder and struck her head. She did not appear to have
any injury of consequence but shortly thereafter she suffered
severe headaches and nausea, and lost her sense of balance. The
question involved was whether she had been injured in the accident
or had had a stroke not connected with the accident. The Court reviewed the evidence given by the doctors, both oral testimony and
written reports, some of which had not been formally introduced
in evidence before the Commission and determined that the compe* 262 P. 2d 926, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
* 263 P. 2d 817, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
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tent evidence, together with reasonable inferences which could be
made therefrom, were sufficient to support the award.
In School District v. Schmidt,7 the claimant was employed as
a janitor by the School District. The School District made a deal
with a local church under which the church sent some of its members to the school to do the janitor's work while the janitor stuccoed
the church. He fell from a scaffolding and claimed compensation
under Section 11 of the act which provides compensation for an
employee loaned by employer "who has accepted the provisions of
this act." The argument was that since the School District is required to accept, it was not covered under Section 11. The Court
held the case compensable, stating that it could see no intent to
distingush between a private employer and a school district.
Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act was considered
by the Supreme Court in Flake Motors v. Industrial Commission,'
Flake Motors was a partnership in the used car business in Denver. The firm entered into a contract with one Carter to erect a
sign on its used car lot. The claimant was an employee of Carter
and was injured while working on the sign. He filed a claim against
both-Carter and Flake Motors for compensation, claiming that
Flake Motors was contracting out part of its business when it engaged Carter to build and maintain the sign. Claimant was hired,
supervised, paid, and furnished with tools by Carter. The Commission and the District Court held that Flake Motors was jointly
liable with Carter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Flake
Motors was in the business of buying and selling automobiles, not
in the sign business.
An interesting decision under Section 52 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act is U. S. National Bank v. Industrial CommissionY Mr. and Mrs. Conway, parents of two minor children, were
both employed by the same employer, and while engaged in such
employment, were simultaneously killed in an airplane crash. The
bank as guardian of the children filed claims before the Industrial Commission in both the father's case and the mother's case.
On the strength of the case of London Guarantee and Accident Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 78 Colo. 478, the Commission granted
compensation to the children in the father's case, but denied it in
the mother's case, holding that the children were totally dependent
upon the father. The District Court affirmed, but the Supreme
Court reversed and granted full compensation in both cases. The
Court held tha under Section 52, children of the deceased are conclusively presumed to be totally dependent. It is wholly a question
of law under the statute. The Commission erred in determining
as a matter of fact that the children were wholly dependent on the
father. If they are children of the deceased, whether the deceased
1263 P. 2d 581, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
8 262 P. 2d 736, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
9262 P. 2d 731, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.

DICTA

December, 1954

be their father or mother or both, they are conclusively presumed
to be dependents and entitled to compensation.
The case of Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission,10 involves the provisions of Section 81 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In that case, the claimant was injured at work and
was put under the care of company physicians. After being treated
by these physicians for some time, he became dissatisfied with their
services and without permission of the employer went to his own
doctor who performed an operation to relieve his condition. The
employer took the position that since the claimant changed doctors without the approval of the employer or of the Commission,
he was not entitled to any benefits, either compensation or medical,
from the time the change was made. The Commission granted full
compensation and medical benefits and the District Court affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that under Section 81 the employer did not
have to pay for any medical or hospital expenses incurred by the
claimant without its consent, but that it was liable to pay compensation for temporary total disability and permanent partial disability resulting from the accident.
Section 84, dealing with the statute of limitations, was considered by the Supreme Court in Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Indutrial Commission." In that case the claimant died as a result of
a burn on his foot which in turn caused a pulmonary embolus, or
at least that was the finding of the Commission on conflicting evidence which the Court would not disturb on review under the well
established rule discussed above. The widow, on behalf of herself
and two minor children, did not file claim for compensation until
more than one year after the accident. After the accident, the
widow went to the employer to collect some group insurance benefits. At that time she asked if the Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. did
not have "state insurance" and the reply was, "No, this is all the
insurance we carry. We're self-insured." The Court held that this
reply was misleading and that that fact, coupled with the fact that
the widow did not know that the death had been caused by accident,
was sufficient evidence of a "reasonable excuse" to prevent the running of the statute. The Court also held that the burden of proving that the employer has been prejudiced by failure to file a claim
is on the employer.
Finally, in the cases of Sterns-Roger Manufacturing Co. v.
Casteel 12 and Devore v. Industrial Commission,13 the court considered procedural questions under Section 97. In the Sterns-Roger's
case the claimant and a fellow worker were on their way from
Denver to Grand Junction to work for the employer. On the way
they bought a bottle of whiskey and apparently imbibed generously
therefrom. When the friend was driving and the claimant was
10269
"269
"261
1 266

P.
P.
P.
P.

2d 1070, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 13.
2d 696, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
2d 288, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 1.
2d 774, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
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asleep in the back seat, an accident occurred injuring claimant.
The insurance carrier contested the case on two grounds: First,
that the accident did not arise out of the employment and, second,
that if it did, that the 50 per cent penalty provided for in Section
83(c) where the injury results from intoxication, be invoked. The
referee ruled against the carrier on both of these points and granted
full compensation. The carrier, within 15 days, filed a petition to
review, raising both points. The Commission then reviewed the
file and affirmed the award of the referee but invoked the 50 per
cent penalty. The carrier did not petition to review this award but
the claimant filed a petition to review the Commission's award in
sofar as it invoked the penalty. On this petition, the Commission
reversed itself and found the case compensable and did not invoke
the penalty. The carrier then filed a petition to review, raising both
the questions of compensability and of the penalty. By this time,
the Commission had made up its mind and it affirmed its award of
full compensation. The carrier appealed, raising both the question
of whether the accident arose out of the employment and the question of penalty. The Supreme Court held that the first question
was not before it. When the Commission found the case to be compensable but invoked the penalty, no petition to review the determination of compensability was filed within 15 days and that issue
became final even though the claimant did petition to review on the
penalty determination. On the question of penalty, the court held
that since the claimant was asleep in the car when the accident happened, his injury did not result from his intoxication and the Commission was correct when it finally decided not to invoke the penalty.
In the Devore case the claimant admittedly failed to file a petition to review an award within the 15 day period prescribed by
statute but contended that she was excused from doing so because
the award was not sent to the correct address. She contended that
at the time of the award, she was in General Rose Hospital in
Denver, and that the Commission knew this because a hearing had
been held at her bedside. The award was sent to her Fort Collins
home where all former papers in the matter were sent. The Court
held that the notice had been properly sent in accordance with Section 97, and that the courts had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The two unemployment compensation cases both involve situations arising under Section 5 and 6 of the Colorado Unemployment
Security Act, dealing with disqualification of a claimant for voluntarily leaving work or refusing suitable employment. In the first,
Industrial Commission v. Brady,14 the claimant was a journeyman
painter and a member of the painters' union. He was out of work
and drawing compensation, when the department of unemployment
security located a job for him with one Davis. This was a nonunion job and paid $2.00 per hour. The union rate was $2.35 per
hour. He refused the job and was accordingly disqualified for un14 263

P. 2d 578, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
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employment compensation. At a hearing before a referee, it was
found that the prevailing wage was $2.39 per hour with time and
a half for overtime. The referee held that the offered work was at
a wage substantially less favorable than that prevailing for similar
work in the locality and ruled the claimant was not disqualified.
The Commission reversed the referee. Thie District Court reversed
the Commission. The Supreme Court held the claimant was not
disqualified. The Court said all of the evidence proved that the
prevailing wage rate was $2.39 per hour, and that the offer to the
claimant was substantially less favorable than the prevailing wage
rate.
In the second case, Industrial Commission v. Wilbanks," the
claimant, a union carpenter, quit a job at Estes Park which paid
$2.00 per hour but no overtime. There was testimony concerning
the prevailing wage rate in a number of different localities, including Estes Park, and there was conflict in the evidence as to what
the rate was. The Court held that Estes Park was a distinct locality and there being conflict in the evidence as to the prevailing
wage rate in that locality; the Court would not disturb the findings
of fact of the Commission which had found the claimant was disqualified.
In Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Alitto, 6 our court had occasion to construe the provisions of the Occupational Disease Act
which deal with silicosis. The claimant went to work in 1908 as
a bricklayer. It was undisputed that in this work he was exposed
to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide. He continued in this work
until 1945 when he became a master brick mason. There was evidence that from that date until his death in 1952, he was still exposed to silicon dioxide dust on numerous occasions in his supervisory job. The employer took the position that there was not any
evidence of an injurious exposure to silicon dioxide dust for at least
sixty days after the effective date of the act. The Court held there
was such exposure. The Court held further that it was not necessary that the claimant have been exposed sixty days after the effective date of the act. The Court again repeated its previous holding that the Occupational Disease Act is to be liberally construed
to effect its purpose.
LABOR LAW
Under this heading there have been two decisions in the past
here: one involving a labor dispute in the usual sense of the word,
and one a policeman's pension case.
In United Mine Workers v. Sunlight Coal Co. 17 the court was
called upon to construe the language of the Labor Peace Act which
provides that the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction over employers who regularly engage the services of eight or more em" 271 P. 2d -, 1953-54 C. B. D. Adv. Sh. No. 17.
- 273 P. 2d 725, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 18.
270 P. 2d 776, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
IT
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ployees. The evidence in the case indicated that the employer involved, during the months of December, 1952, and January, 1953,
had 14 employees working in the mine. In a report to the government, the employer had reported his yearly average of employees
was 6.7. The State Coal Mine Inspection Report for the year 1952
showed that the company had an average of 9.4 men working during that year.
The Court held that to determine whether employees are "regularly engaged", the test is to determine whether the employment
was casual or whether these were regular employees engaged in the
business. It was held that the employees involved were regular
employees and not casual laborers and that therefore the Industrial
Commission had jurisdiction to hear the dispute.
8
In the case of Pension Fund Trustees v. Starasinich,1
the
plaintiff was a police officer on the Pueblo Police Department for
23 years up to July 30, 1949, when he was discharged for misconduct. After his discharge, he applied for a pension, claiming that
he had incurred physical disabilities while he was a police officer
in good standing. The question to be determined was whether after
discharge an officer could apply for and receive a pension. The argument of the trustees was that under the statutes and ordinances
applicable, an officer must be in good standing at the time of the
application to be entitled to a pension. The Court held that in order
to be entitled to a pension, an officer must be in good standing at
the time of death or injury and that the fact that he has been discharged since his injury will not bar him from a pension if he was
in good standing at the time of the injury.
From its title, the case of Shore v. Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades Council,19 would appear to be a case involving labor
law. An examination of the case will reveal that basically it is a
labor case but although the case has been twice tried in the District
Court and twice-appealed to the Supreme Court no question of labor
law has yet been raised in a form calling for a decision by the
Supreme Court. There will be a third trial in the District Court
and probably a third appeal, and perhaps some later reviewer will
have occasion to review the labor questions involved.

FAMILY LAW, PROBATE LAW, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SAM FRAZIN, of the Denver Bar

FAMILY LAW
I. Lawson v. Lawson, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 1.
Facts: Plaintiff, the wife, was a resident of Denver throughout her entire life. She went to Fortville, Indiana, for the sole purpose of marrying the defendant who was then stationed there in
264 P. 2d 1033, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 7.
263 P. 2d 315, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
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the military service. The husband's home was in St. Joseph, Missouri, and the evidence shows he did not accept her as his wife by
the way of making or attempting to make, nor did he have any
thought of making, a domicile for her. She finally left and returned
to Denver where she filed suit for divorce alleging mental cruelty
and her residence in the state for more than one year prior to
commencement of the action. Judge Edward C. Day, after hearing the evidence, questioned the sufficiency of the showing of residence, taking the position generally that plaintiff had lost her residence in Denver by leaving the state and marrying defendant in
another state; that the domicile of the plaintiff was that of her
husband; that she should wait for one year after her return to
Denver before filing action for divorce.
Appeal: Held for Judge Day.
Reasons: A Colorado woman who marries a resident of another state acquires the domicile of her husband and must wait one
year after her return to Colorado before filing an action for
divorce in this state. It is interesting to note as said by the Supreme
Court that so far as the best interests of plaintiff are concerned,
if the time consumed in presenting this Writ of Error had been
used to allow the running of the period by filing another complaint,
after a full year's residence had been established after plaintiff's
return to Colorado, plaintiff would no doubt have had a perfectly
good and valid Interlocutory Decree of Divorce long before the
date of this decision.
II. Vance v. Vance, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 1.
Facts: Plaintiff husband filed action for divorce on the ground
of cruelty committed in Colorado. Defendant wife denied and
counter-claimed alleging abandonment without cause for a Decree
of Separate Maintenance. Trial by jury found wife not guilty of
mental cruelty and husband not guilty of abandonment. Wife then
filed a motion to set aside the verdict against her and prayed for
the Decree of Separate Maintenance notwithstanding the verdict.
This motion was sustained and the verdict of the jury finding that
the husband was not guilty of abandonment without just cause was
set aside. A Decree of Separate Maintenance was granted to the
wife and alimony of $305.00 per month. Later husband filed a
motion to modify the decree by terminating the maintenance on
the ground that since the entry thereof the wife had been guilty of
serious misconduct. The matter was heard before Honorable Robert W. Steele. Judge Steele found that by the misconduct the wife
had forfeited the right to further maintenance from plaintiff.
At the time of this hearing a divorce suit filed by the husband
was pending before Honorable William A. Black in another division
of the District Court. It was stipulated between counsel that this
divorce case be transferred from Judge Black's division to that of
Judge Steele and that the testimony received by Judge -Steele in
the separate maintenance hearing be considered by him as testi-
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mony in support of the ground of cruelty alleged in the divorce
petition. Accordingly this was heard by Judge Steele as a noncontested divorce action the wife having filed no answer. Judge
Steele considered the testimony presented in the separate maintenance hearing and entered an Interlocutory Decree of Divorce
for plaintiff husband. About' three months later defendant wife
filed a motion to set aside the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce which
was over-ruled. Counsel contends that the trial court erred in
over-ruling the motion to vacate and set aside the Interlocutory
Decree generally on the ground that an Interlocutory Decree in
Divorce cannot be granted without the presentation of any evidence; that the parties cannot stipulate that the testimony in another case be considered as evidence sufficient for the entry of a
Decree of Divorce.
Appeal: Held for husband.
Reasons: 1. The right to separate maintenance may be lost
by serious acts of misconduct.
2. Parties may stipulate that the record of testimony in a
separate maintenance action shall be accepted as a substitute for
evidence in a later divorce case when that testimony relates to the
same parties, time and events. This is not a stipulation that a
divorce be granted.
III. Russ v. Russ, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 2.
Facts: Plaintiff wife divorced defendant husband. Husband
had adopted James, a minor son of the wife by a former marriage.
The decree provided "to pay for the support of James the sum of
$100.00 per month and further to pay all medical expenses that
may be incurred necessarily for James Russ including the cost of
any necessary operations until he should become 18 years of age."
It was further agreed and provided in the decree that a named
mutual friend shall be the sole judge as to the necessity of medical
and special care and expenditures for James Russ, but if for any
reason she cannot or does not exercise her judgment in the matter
then the question of medical necessities and attention shall be decided by the District Court of Alamosa County; Colorado or by any
judge.
Wife thereafter filed motion to require former husband to
pay $1661.45 for hospital and medical expenses. Court ordered
husband to pay bills totaling $1381.11.
Appeal: Held for defendant husband.
Reasons: 1. A husband cannot be compelled to pay unnecessary medical expenses for a child where the terms of the divorce
decree obligate him only to pay such expenses which are incurred
necessarily.
2. The mutual friend named in the decree had in writing declined to exercise her judgment in the matter. The provisions of
the agreement and the decree made the role of the judge that of an
arbitrator rather than that of the judge of the court. He took on
the status of the named mutual friend who declined to act and in
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that capacity he should have listened to the evidence and made his
finding as to the necessity of the expenses and then the court should
have acted upon the findings so made.
3. In the absence of a decree or an agreement between the
parties the liability for medical payments lies within the discretion
of the Court.
IV. Miller v. Miller, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 5.
Facts: Plaintiff wife sued for divorce seeking custody and
control of two minor children. Defendant husband was granted the
divorce on his cross-complaint and given full custody and control
of the children. After the entry of the final decree the wife filed a
motion for modification of the decree which later the court modified directing that the wife have custody of the children during the
months of June, July and August of each year. Not being satisfied
with this modification she appealed to the District Court which
denied the motion and entered an order to the effect that the original order as entered in the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce remain
in full force and effect.
Appeal: Held for plaintiff wife.
Reasons: Where a child becomes a ward of a County Court by
virtue of a divorce action the court has continuing jurisdiction and
a custody order is not a final judgment which can be appealed. I
recommend the reading of the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Moore and concurred in by Mr. Justice Clark.)
V. Faith v. Faith, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 5.
Facts: Plaintiff husband filed suit against defendant wife for
divorce. Wife counter claimed and later withdrew her answer and
permitted cause to proceed as a non-contested case, resulting in
entry of Intelocutory Decree in favor of plaintiff. Decree contained
usual provisions. One week before Decree became final plaintiff filed
motion requesting the court to vacate and set aside the Interlocutory Decree. Court granted this motion over the objection of the
defendant.
Appeal: Held for plaintiff.
Reasons: Trial court must grant a motion to dismiss and set
aside an Interlocutory Decree of Divorce a few days before it becomes final even though the motion states no reasons, is not supported by the evidence and is objected to by the defendant. The
policy of the court is to discourage rather than encourage divorces.
One may well be entitled to a divorce but whether or not he will
exercise that right is optional with him.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I. Higgins v. Sinnock, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 9.
Facts: Old age pensioners, the phintiffs herein, are complaining about an amendment to the Old Age Pension Act which concerns payments to inmates of mental institutions. As a method of
procedure the payments are to be made to the Chief Financial Officer of the institution and he in turn is to disburse the money to
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the inmates. The pensioners complain that this method of procedure is unconstitutional. The pensioners, the plaintiffs herein,
are in no way connected with any institution.
Appeal: Held for defendants.
Reasons: This amendment sets up payments to inmates of
institutions and said payments are to be made to the Chief Financial Officer. Thus only the rights of two parties are involved herein. They are (1) the Chief Financial Officer and (2) the inmates
of the institutions. Petitioners do not fall into either group for
they are merely old age pensioners.
An act entitling inmates of a state institution to participate
with others in proceeds of the old age pension fund is constitutional
and only parties in interest can challenge the constitutionality of
the method of payment provided. The pensioners in this case have
no interest in this act.
II.

People v. Schaeffer, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 11.
Facts: Plaintiff herein was adopted by her uncle now deceased
after she had reached her majority. Defendant, Inheritance Tax
Department taxed plaintiff as a Class C beneficiary, a niece. Plaintiff contends she is a Class A beneficiary-an adopted child.
The statutory provisions pertinent in this case are contained
in Section 14, Chapter 85, '35 CSA as amended by Chapter 146,
SL 41 which imposes a graduated rate of tax upon inheritance
by dividing beneficiaries into classes. Class A is subject to the lowest rate of tax and includes a father, mother, husband, wife, child
or any child or children legally adopted as such. The portion of the
statute which forms the basis of this controversy is as follows:
"Provided, however, that for the purpose of this act no person shall
be considered legally adopted unless the adoption decree was entered prior to such person reaching the age of 21 years."
There is approximately $10,000.00 involved herein. Plaintiff
contends that in setting up the age of 21 the legislature was arbitrary, unjustly discriminate and therefore this part of the act is
unconstitutional.
Appeal: Held for defendant.
Reasons: 1. 21 is not an arbitrary age. The reasoning is that
if a person is under 21 and is adopted greater family ties occur.
2. If a person is adopted over the age of 21 it is quite often
done so as to evade paying inheritance taxes.
3. Legislation which sets up two classes of adopted children
for inheritance tax purposes based upon whether the child was
adopted before or after age 21 is not discriminatory or unconstitutional for such classifications have sanction in reason and logic.
4. Stare decisis does not mean the perpetuation of error. The
Court here refers to a former case in which the opinion was just
the opposite, being Hoggan v. The People being opinions dated
August 14, 1954, Issue No. 17 and the Supreme Court hereby overrules its opinion in that case.
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I. Kling v. Phayer, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 18.
Facts: Plaintiff, administratrix of Phayer estate, sues defendant for $112.50 damages to Phayer's automobile and $707.82
for funeral expenses. Defendant's negligence was clearly established and is not at issue. Defendant claims administratrix cannot
maintain an action for the recovery of funeral expenses. It is contended that this can only be collected under the Wrongful Death
Statute which limits the parties in interest to the immediate family, and plaintiff is not a member of the immediate family in this
case. However, the plaintiff adminstratrix contends she has the
right to maintain the action under our Survival Statute being
Chapter 176, Section 247, '35 CSA which reads, "All actions in law
whatsoever save and except actions on the case for slander or
libel, or trespass or injuries done to the person, and actions
brought for the recovery, of real estate, shall survive to and against
executors, administrators and conservators."
Appeal: Held for plaintiff.
Reasons: The present action is for recovery independent of
the Wrongful Death Statute. The administratrix here is not seeking to recover for injuries to the person as provided in the Statute
but is trying to recover for damages to decedent's property, that
is: Diminution of decedent's estate which would result from the
payment of the funeral bill.
The instant case is an action in law as provided in Section 247,
Chapter 176, '35 CSA Supra and is not one of the exceptions,
namely an action for slander or libel or trespass for injuries done
to the person nor for the recovery of real estate, and therefore it
survives to the administratrix. So under the Survival Statute an
administratrix can recover for the diminution of the estate as a
result of damages to an automobile and the payment of funeral
expenses.
RE: A. C. McLaughlin, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sheet No. 7.
Facts: Testator, a resident of California left a holographic
will unwitnessed and in which he left certain Colorado property to
his sister and the residue to the Texas School of Medicine. The
will was valid in California and admitted to probate. It was later
admitted in this jurisdiction as a foreign will. Two minors of the
deceased daughter of the testator who were excluded from the will
filed a caveat through their guardian claiming:
(1) The will because it is holographic and unwitnessed though
validly executed in California is voidable in Colorado as to Colorado
real estate despite the provisions of the Colorado foreign will
statute.
(2) The gift in the will to testator's surviving sister is void
for vagueness, ambiguousness, uncertainty and impossibility of
administration.
(3) The gift in the will to the University of Texas is likewise
II.
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void because the "School of Medicine, University of Texas," is not a
legal entity capable of taking a gift.
Appeal: Judgment affirmed.
Reasons: A foreign will if valid in a foreign jurisdiction is
valid in Colorado and may be admitted to probate. The filing of a
caveat although permissible does not effect the validity of a foreign
will.
Section 39, Chapter 176, '35 CSA provides that a will must
be in writing, signed and acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two witnesses and declared by him to be his last will and
testament. Section 62A as amended in 1947 provides, "As used in
this section the words 'foreign will' means an instrument in writing which has been or shall be admitted to probate as the last will
and testament or codicil of a decedent before any court or tribunal
other than a court of this state, such court or tribunal being
authorized by the laws of such jurisdiction to admit the same to
probate, whether or not such instrument was executed in accordance with Section 39 of this Chapter."
It is further provided in this opinion that the devise to the
sister was not ambiguous and, therefore, valid.
It is also further provided that the devise to the Texas School
of Medicine was valid as shown by these citations. The School of
Medicine was a part of the University of Texas and as such a legal
entity.

ATTORNEYS, COURTS, EQUITY
By FLOYD K. MURR, of the Walsenburg Bar
ATTORNEYS

Under the classification of attorneys two cases were decided
by the Supreme Court during the past year. In People v. Logan,1
the Supreme Court disbarred an attorney who wrongfully spent
for his own purpose money received by him from his client for the
purchase of property. The attorney had also retained money collected by him for clients, refusing to make settlement until after
complaint was made to the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association. The referee had recommended suspension but the Court felt
compelled to go beyond because of the gravity of the charges.
In People v. Woodall,2 a layman was fined $200 by the Supreme
Court for drafting and causing to be executed a will. The only
phase of the case presenting a new element was the defense of
respondent, a bank cashier, who alleged he did it because the town's
only resident attorney was always away. The Court apparently
was not impressed with this unusual defense.
11953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 17.
2 1953-54, C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 7.
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In another case to be reported under another topic, 3 the
Supreme Court stated that Sec. 9, Ch. 177, '35 CSA, which prohibits an attorney from being examined as to any communication
made by a client to him, except with permission of the client, does
not apply when the attorney's ethics and professional conduct are
questioned.
COURTS

With some exceptions, the cases assigned for review under the
heading of "Courts" are more noteworthy for their applicability to
other branches of the law.
Two cases dealt with the jurisdiction of County Courts in lunacy matters. In Rickey v. People,4 the complaint in lunacy was
filed in the wrong county, the alleged lunatic being a resident of
another county. In Iwerks v. People,5 the complaint was filed in
the right county, but the process was served by the sheriff in
the wrong county. The sheriff of Adams County went into Denver
County and attempted to serve notice on the alleged incompetent,
where of course he had no authority to act. In both cases, the
Supreme Court held that the County Court was without jurisdiction in the matter. In the latter case, the Attorney General, in confessing error stated that "the facade of the building is regular in
all respects, but its foundation appears to be builded upon the sands
of expediency and not on the rock of legal authority".
A gift taxpayer found himself in a dilemma in the complicated
case of People v. Maytag,6 but only a thumb nail sketch will be
attempted here. The inheritance tax commissioner, who administers the gift tax law, 7 failed to determine the tax and give notice
thereof within the time then required by sections 10 and 11 of the
Act. This was held not to affect the duty of the commissioner to
compute and collect the gift tax due the state in a previous decision by the Supreme Court involving the same parties." The taxpayer was told by the Supreme Court in that case that if he were
dissatisfied with the deermination of tax, he should proceed under
that part of the Act which in substance provides for a remedy by
petition to a Court by an aggrieved taxpayer on the grounds of
"erroneous valuatiQn, appraisement, or assessment or otherwise". 9
This action was then filed by taxpayer expressly under the Act
asking the Court again to prohibit the commissioner from computing the tax for his failure to determine the tax within the time and
give notice as required by the Act. The Supreme Court held that
these questions were decided in the original action and that res
judicata precluded their consideration. The Court then held that
3Browning

v. Potter, 271 P. 2d 418, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 15.
P. 2d 1021, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 10.
'273 P. 2d 133, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 17.
'270 P. 2d 782, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 13.
7COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 25A (1935).
'1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 13, p. 289.
4267

'CoLo.

STAT. ANN.. C. 75A, §15 (1935).
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the statutory remedy which provides for review of the tax on
grounds of erroneous "valuation, appraisement or assessment, or
otherwise", gives a court a limited jurisdiction to review only the
appraisement, assessment or valuation concerning a gift tax. The
word "otherwise" was held to qualify the words "valuation, appraisement or assessment". The court incidentally remarked that
neither the attorney general nor the commissioner has any authority to compromise a gift tax.
In the case of Oliver v. Harper,10 the Supreme Court was
asked to determine the disposition of $19 which had been paid into
the registry of Court by the sureties on a bond under the mistaken
impression that they were to pay the costs in addition to the judgment for the maximum liability on their bond. The Supreme Court
held that the overpayment of a judgment by $19 could not be considered an appeal and that a statement of the trial court that the
$19 should be returned to the sureties did not amount to a valid
judgment and that further litigation would be required to dispose of the money.
In Calvin v. Fitzsimmons," a judgment of the trial court in a
boundary line dispute which determined that the boundary line
between the land of the plaintiff and the land of the defendant is
"that line along which a fence was constructed by the plaintiff
between said lands in the year 1940, as shown by the evidence and
testimony herein", was held to be invalid because of uncertainty
where the fence had been completely destroyed in 1949, and its
former location could be ascertained only from those familiar with
its location. The Supreme Court said:
. * assuming that there was evidence before the Court
which would enable it to definitely and specifically describe
the boundaries between these two quarter sections, nevertheless, it was not incorporated in the judgment and decree.
Browning v. Potter12 is a case in which both the executor and
the heirs of a decedent were validly served with summons in a suit
to adjudicate interests in certain mining claims under Rule 105,
R.C.P. Colorado. Neither the executor nor the heirs filed answers
or appeared in the suit within the time required by the rules of
procedure and default was entered against them. The heirs sought
to have the defaults vacated on the grounds of excusable neglect,
setting forth that the executor suffered a mental aberration which
prevented his taking action to protect their interests and alleging
also that an attorney failed to perform properly his professional
duty to them. The Supreme Court sustained the lower court in refusing to vacate the defaults pointing out that the executor, who
had suffered a stroke in 1949, was not incapacitated in 1952 when
10267 P. 2d 1114, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 10.

" 270 P. 2d 748, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
" 271 P. 2d 420, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 15.
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the action was commenced; that during the period involved he discussed matters intelligently, and furnished counsel with addresses
of non-resident defendants; that he was not confined to his room
and took his meals at restaurants and had discussed the case with
others. The Court dismissed the contention of the heirs that their
default was due to an attorney where the record showed that the
attorney advised the heirs orally and in writing that he did not
represent them in this case.
•.. the burden is upon a defendant to establish the grounds
on which he relies, by clear and convincing proof; the
granting or denial of an application to vacate a default,
based on excusable neglect, rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court...
The functions of judge and jury in a tort case are demonstrated
in Eberle v. Hungerford,13 in which plaintiff was a guest. The
Supreme Court held that plaintiff was no less a guest because she
had given the driver of the automobile $2.00 to "help on gas" and
the Court sustained the trial judge in directing a verdict in favor
of the driver where the evidence did not show more than ordinary
negligence on his part. But the trial judge was held to be in error
in directing a verdict in favor of the driver of the other automobile
where there was a dispute in the testimony as to which, if any,
driver went through a red light at the intersection where the collision occurred. This presented an issue of fact for the jury to decide, for if the driver of the other vehicle was negligent, plaintiff
could recover against him.
4
In Woodruff v. Clarke,1
a wife purchased a home with funds
given to her by her husband's mother and took title to the property
in her own name. In an action by a judgment creditor of the husband, whose judgment was obtained before the wife purchased the
property, the trial court determined that the husband had an interest in the home which the wife held as trustee, and referred the
matter to a referee to determine the amount of this interest. The
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and said that the husband
had no interest in the property which could be reached by his judgment creditor. The fact that the husband had paid some interest on
the indebtedness which was outstanding on the property did not
warrant the trial court's determination that he owned an interest
in the home.
Finally, in State Highway Department v. Swift, 5 a stipulation
in condemnation proceedings which required the highway department to construct access roads from the highway across certain
described parcels of land owned by landowner was construed by the
Supreme Court as not requiring the Highway Department to construct bridges to connect the access roads to the highway.
1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 18.
262 P. 2d 738, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
18 270 P. 2d 750, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
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EQUITY
Among the cases assigned to be reported under the heading of
"Equity", two involved laches. Plaintiff was not barred by laches
in Prosser v. Schmidt 16 where during a period of approximately
four years the defendants had failed to execute and deliver a
deed and obtain releases of certain mortgages in accordance with
their written agreement to convey certain lands to plaintiff and the
evidence showed plaintiff was at all times ready and able to perform his part of the agreement. There was evidence that defendants were away much of the time and that plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to contact them. The Court held that "delay that might
be chargeable to plaintiff did not start to run against him until
there was full tender or performance on the part of defendants".
An interesting aspect of this case is the finding by the Supreme
Court that defendants' counsel in his brief on appeal had re-arranged the facts to create a favorable impression. The Court said:
"Voluntary enlargement of the facts shown by the testimony in an
attempt to augment defendants' defensive position does not enhance their standing before a Court of equity".
Laches did bar the remedy in McDermott v. Bent County, Colorado Irr. Dist.17 where petitioners sought to require an irrigation
district to pay for services rendered some 19 to 30 years prior to
filing suit. A bond issue had been approved by a decree of the
District Court in 1932 to pay the district's indebtedness, and apparently, the petitioners proposed at that time to accept bonds of
the district in lieu of cash in settlement of their claims against the
district. The bonds were never issued and the decree was not recorded in the office of the County Clerk until 2 months before this
action. In the meantime, more than 14,000 acres of land in the
district went to tax sale, tax deeds were issued, titles were quieted
and intervening purchases of the land were made by persons having no notice of petitioners' claims. In addition to denying petitioners' claims because of their laches, the Supreme Court seemed
to hold, re-stating a well settled doctrine, that the tax titles extinguished any prior liens and initiated new titles to the lands embraced within the district.
In Howard v. Beavers,18 a contract for the sale and exchange
of real estate was not sufficiently definite to authorize the remedy
of specific performance. The contract provided as follows: . . .
and said party of the first part will . .. convey back unto the party
of the second part a mortgage on the property hereinabove described ... for $14,800, being the balance due to the party of the
second part . . ." No other provisions relating to the mortgage
appeared in the contract. Because the time and terms of payment
of the mortgage were not set forth, the degree of certainty reIs262 P. 2d 272, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 2.
" 272 P. 2d 995, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
264 P. 2d 858, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 6.
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quired for specific performance was absent. The Court refused to
hold that the parties intended the execution of a demand mortgage.
The Court held however, that the contract was sufficiently certain
to sustain an action for damages for breach of contract.
The novel part of this case was that plaintiff, after suit was
begun, executed a deed to the real estate he was to exchange and
sent it by registered mail to the defendant. Because the defendant
received and retained the deed, plaintiff argued that defendant ratified the contract or in some way was put in constructive possession
of the real estate described in the deed. The Court summarily disposed of this contention saying there was no delivery or acceptance
of the deed and that the self serving act of the plaintiff did not
ripen into an estoppel as against defendant.
In another case, an octogenarian sold and conveyed his homestead on a day when by his own testimony he was as "healthy as
a ground hog"; but he did not feel well the next day and sometime
later brought an action to set aside his deed on grounds of fraud
and undue influence. This, in a nutshell, is the case of Bivens v.
Van Matre,19 in which the trial court was sustained in holding that
the evidence was not sufficiently clear and convincing to authorize
the setting aside of the deed. The facts also showed that the transaction was reviewed for plaintiff by an attorney selected by plaintiff before. the deed was executed and that the price paid plaintiff
for the land was comparable to prices received for other lands
recently sold in the vicinity.
Merth v. Hobart,20 involved an action for partition in which
the Supreme Court stated that there is no difference in a partition
suit as to property held by tenants in common and property held
by joint tenants. The case is a factual one in which the trial court
was sustained in its findings that plaintiff's $10,000 which was
used to purchase a home in her name and in the names of the defendants, husband and wife, as joint tenants, should be returned
to the plaintiff, there being no agreement obligating the parties in
any manner.
19

270 P. 2d 761, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
272 P. 2d 273, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.

Your contribution to the Colorado Bar Foundation today
will still be promoting a better administration of justice in
Colorado for generations to come. The corpus of funds which
the Foundation acquires cannot be invaded. Name the Colorado Bar Foundation in your Will. Mail your contribution
today to the Colorado Bar Foundation, 702 Midland Savings
Building, Denver 2, Colorado.
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BOOK TRADERS CORNER
David McKee at AComa 2-2521 has the following books for
sale:
Corpus Juris Secondum, Vols. 1 to 84
American Law Reports, Annotated, Vols. 1-175
American Law Reports, Permanent Digest, Vols. 1-12
American Law Reports, Blue Book, Vols 1 and 2
American Law Reports, Digest Index, 1 Vol.
American Law Reports, Second Series, Vols. 1-36
American Law Reports, Second Series, (Digest, Vols. 1-25, 1 Vol.)
American Law Reports, Blue Book, Second Series, 1 Vol.
American Law Reports, Second Series, Red Desk Service, 1 Vol.
Federal Reporter, Second Series, Vols. 123-211
McQuillin Municipal Corporation, Vols. 1-7
McQuillin Municipal Corporation, Supplemental 1930 & 1932
U. S. Code Annotated, complete including index of four volumes,
tables-2 vols.; constitution-4 vols.
U. S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 1948 through
1953.
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